Rational Gay Union Policy

I'm not attempting to steal JurisNaturalist's thunder, but our recent discussion of the rationality of gay union is even more important to post because we're both fairly conservative Christian men.

JN sent me an e-mail this morning about a possible paper topic. A general outline of our discussion (he might contest it was one-sided pontificating) is below.

Assumptions:

1. Heterosexual unions (hereafter referred to as "marriages") are good for society. They promote procreation, family values, sexual and mental health, and general happiness.
2. Heterosexual couples choose to enter into marriage for these reasons, and according to individual sets of tastes and preferences (often, individuals are said to display a "vector" of preferences, tradition being one common example).
3. Marriage is a private contract and subject to analogs of common contract law. Divorces, alimony, custody and more have analogs in breech of contract, reparations, and property ownership, respectively (forgive the coldness).
4. Individuals enter into contracts only when it is beneficial to both parties.
5. It has not been widely shown by credible sources that homosexual unions (hereafter referred to as "gay unions") are not afforded the same quality of life improvements set forth in step 1.
   
6. It follows that all couples, regardless of sexuality, benefit from union (steps 1 and 4 with 5).
7. As long as individuals benefit, society's welfare increases.
8. It is in the best interest of governments to sanction unions for all couples.

Caveats:

1. Some members of society may receive disutility from the existence of gay unions. One might imagine an extreme conservative Christian to be extremely irked by his state's passage of such a law. In this case, social welfare decreases.
2. Some members of the gay community receive disutility from the ban or non-recognition of gay unions. One might imagine an extreme leftist progressive becoming irate over a state ban of gay marriage. In this case, social welfare also decreases.

We are left with no decision. Either banning or allowing gay union will decrease social welfare. We much measure the total welfare effect of each and compare three worlds:

1. Where gay union is allowed
2. Where gay union is banned
3. Where those receiving disutility from the permission of gay union do not exist

In the first two worlds, both containing the individual that receive disutility from permission, social welfare is not optimal. When that common factor is removed, in world 3, social welfare is optimized based on the above assumptions (thought process).

We see, then, that the market for gay union has a positive externality in that it increases total social welfare, but costs of offending idealogues are included in any individual policy decision. Following general theory of market failures and government intervention from any basic resource economics course, one sees that gay unions are underprovided. This is much in the same way that education is thought to be underprovided in Externalities in a Nutshell; however, in that article, higher than normal costs are borne by buyers but in gay unions, these costs are borne by other individuals.

It occurs to me that, by my last statement, this means the market for gay unions contains a negative externality, not a positive one. This means that the market over-provides the number of unions. However, I believe this discrepancy lies in whom one place initial rights (see Property Law or Google for some more information on "initial allocation". If anyone can find a hole in my logic, please leave a comment. If a negative externality is actually the case, the following analysis is perfectly incorrect.

The common solution, then, is that government intervene to create an environment conducive to more gay unions, either silencing or removal of the offended, or in some other way encouraging couples to enter this contract. If this means subsidizing the union, then I see potential laws being similar to current marriage laws, including tax breaks for the union, for raising children, etc.

It seems more likely, however, that the first step be allowing the unions to take place at all.

Paper Idea: The Benefits of a U.S. Multiparty System

Any well-connected reader might have noticed third-party candidate news during the last election, and I'm sure it will come up again. With movies like Man of the Year becoming more popular, the ideas of third parties and general political change are enjoyed by most of the public.

Train of thought:

1. Third parties create political dialog through special interest proposals
2. Third parties reduce polarization through increased choice (it's tough to be "in the middle" of three diverse groups)
3. Legislative debate and dialog produce ideas
4. More ideas are better than less ideas (due to increased choice)
5. Third parties encourage public debate (in homes and/or media)
6. Public opinion influences elected official behavior (perhaps principal-agent connection)
7. Ideas will be "purchased" in the market through policy
8. Only quality policy will pass the rigorous debate phase
9. Quality policy increases voter happiness, participation

Hypotheses:

1. Quality of policy after established third party participation increases.
2. Quality policy increases voter participation.

Maybe:

1. Quality policy has spillover effects: decreasing bureaucracy or its costs, increasing satisfaction, decreasing domestic unrest or terrorism, increased unemployment, efficient taxing, &c.
   

Cheating: Jobs and Relationships

Without going into too much detail, please take the following scenario:

1. Policemen need to be honest.
2. The nature of their work exposes them to bribes: opportunities to "cheat."
3. Their decision to cheat relies partly on the probability of getting caught, the amount of the bribe, and some sense of satisfaction (with themselves, their ethics, their job, etc.).
4. Many less will cheat with a higher salary, but bribes may just become bigger to compensate.
5. So, they may be kept from cheating by keeping a significant portion of their compensation out of their pockets until their entire career can be "certified" clean; that is, give a good pension to the deserving, good cop.

Now, it may not seem natural at first, but taking the scenario of a spouse, or commited one into account:

1. Spouses need to be honest. Love one another. Be trustworthy. All that jazz.
2. The nature of being a social animal exposes them to plenty of opportunities to "cheat." Define that however you wish.
3. Their decision to cheat relies partly on the probability of getting caught, the reward for cheating (the attractiveness of the individual, their attentiveness, their gifts, etc.), and some sense of satisfaction (with themselves, their ethics, their relationship, etc.).
4. Many less will cheat with a better looking mate, a higher combined income, better emotional security... but barring it all they may just cheat with an even further attractive mate. In the end, its all about morals. Why else would super-celebs cheat?
   
5. So, then, what keeps one from cheating? A significant portion of compensation must be kept until after a clean record can be proven. Since gifts, income, and even beauty don't make much sense here, I am left an appearantly logical conclusion: give good couples a great reward. God will give us good "pensions" for displaying His love and commitment in our human endeavours on Earth.